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1
Abstract
A two-period model in which a monopolist endeavors to learn about the permanent demand
parameter of a specific repeat buyer is presented. The buyer may strategically reject the seller’s
first-period offer for one of two reasons. First, in order to conceal information (i.e., to pool),
a high-valuation buyer may reject high prices that would never be accepted by a low-valuation
buyer. Second, in order to reveal information (i.e., to signal), a low-valuation buyer may reject low
prices that would always be accepted by a high-valuation buyer. Given this, the seller often finds
it optimal to post prices that reveal no useful information. Indeed, in the equilibrium where there
is no signaling, the seller never charges an informative first-period price. Learning may occur in
the equilibrium where there is maximal signaling, but the scope for learning appears to be quite
limited even in this case. Indeed, in order to preempt information transmission through signaling,
the seller may set a first-period price strictly below the buyer’s lowest possible valuation.
Keywords: Price Experimentation, Learning, Strategic Rejections.
JEL Classifications: C73, D81, and D82.
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1 Introduction
In a classic paper, Rothschild (1974) showed that the pricing problem facing a monopolist with
unknown demand is often analogous to a two-armed bandit problem.1 The optimal policy for such a
firm is, therefore, to experiment with prices in order to learn about its unknown demand parameters.
It is, however, well-known that the optimal policy may not result in complete learning because of the
opportunity cost of experimentation. In addition, the learning process may be severely hampered
unless the firm possesses significant prior knowledge about the type of uncertainty confronting it.
For instance, even when demand is deterministic, Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and Jullien (1991) show
that strong conditions such as continuity and quasi-concavity of the profit function are required to
guarantee that a monopolist will eventually learn all the relevant information about its demand. In
this paper, a different caveat is added to the list of reasons that a monopolist may have difficulty in
learning demand. It may serve customers who do not want their demands to be known!
In the prior literature on price experimentation, the possibility of strategic buyers has been
largely ignored. Specifically, it has typically been assumed either that the monopolist faces a se-
quence of identical customers who exist in the market for only one period or that market demand
is composed of a large number of small customers.2 There are, however, many real-world situations
in which buyers have a significant stake in what a firm learns about their demands. Any time that
price discrimination is possible on an individual basis and repeat purchases are likely, buyers possess
incentives for strategic manipulation of demand information. In any long-term supply relationship,
the buyer wants the supplier to think that he has very elastic demand for the product, and the
buyer may strategically reject some offers in order to influence the supplier’s beliefs to this end.
In this paper, a two-period experimental pricing and learning environment is analyzed. There
is assumed to be a single buyer whose underlying (permanent) demand parameter, λ, and current
(transitory) valuation, vt, are private information. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer in the
first period and updates her belief about the value of λ based on the buyer’s acceptance decision. In
particular, acceptance (rejection) of a high price implies that the buyer’s first-period valuation for
the product, v1, was high (low). This leads the seller to update her beliefs about λ and, therefore,
to infer that the buyer’s second-period valuation, v2, is also likely to be high (low). It is shown that
if the buyer is not strategic, then the informational value of a high first-period price can lead the
seller to charge one when it would otherwise not be optimal to do so (i.e., to experiment).
Things are shown to be starkly different, however, when the buyer is strategic. In this case,
if the buyer’s first-period valuation is high, then he will often attempt to conceal information by
1Many authors have subsequently refined and extended this observation. See, for example, Aghion, Bolton, Harris,
and Jullien (1991); Mirman, Samuelson, and Urbano (1993); Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995); Keller and Rady (1999).
2In a related paper, Segal (2003) considers a setting in which there is a finite number of buyers in the market from
the outset. He shows that if the common distribution of buyers’ valuations is unknown, then learning through price
experimentation is dominated by a multi-unit auction which sets a price to each buyer on the basis of the demand
distribution inferred statistically from other buyers’ bids. Segal’s analysis does not apply to the setting considered
here where consumer types are assumed to be drawn from different distributions.
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strategically rejecting high prices. A buyer with a high value of λ stands to gain the most from con-
cealing a high first-period valuation for the good. This gives rise to “reverse screening” in the sense
that only buyers with low values of λ and high valuations for the good will accept high first-period
prices. When the first-period price is low, two limiting types of continuation equilibria exist, a Good
equilibrium (for the seller) in which all buyer types purchase the product, and a Bad equilibrium
in which a buyer with a relatively high value of λ but low valuation for the product strategically
rejects the offer in order to signal his low first-period valuation. This signaling at low prices is the
mirror image of the screening that occurs at high prices in the sense that strategic rejections at
low prices reveal information while strategic rejections at high prices conceal it. When facing a
strategic buyer, the seller typically finds it optimal to set a price that reveals no information about
his demand parameter. In fact, in the Good PBE she never charges an informative first-period price,
and in the Bad PBE she may even set an equilibrium first-period price strictly below the buyer’s
lowest possible valuation in order to forestall signaling, the antithesis of price experimentation!
The pricing and acceptance behavior exhibited in the model presented here can be viewed as a
manifestation of the ratchet effect familiar from the regulation and agency literature.3 Specifically,
the fact that the seller cannot commit not to use the information it learns in the first period harms
it. This lack of commitment generates the strategic rejections by the buyer that give rise to a
weakly lower effective first-period demand for the good. This reduction in the probability of a first-
period sale leaves the seller worse off as compared with a setting in which she could commit to price
non-contingently. This paper also contributes to the burgeoning literature on behavior-based price
discrimination.4 In Internet retailing and many other market settings, firms now have the ability
to track the purchasing behavior of individual customers and to tailor price offers to them.5 To
the extent that consumers are aware of this, the findings presented here indicate that they possess
significant incentives to manipulate the information collected.
The paper closest to this study is Kennan (2001), where it is shown that persistent private
information may lead to stochastic cycles in repeated labor negotiations. While several of the results
presented here are reminiscent of Kennan’s, the two models differ in important ways. First, in the
setting studied by Kennan, a monopolist labor union attempts to learn the current valuation (low
or high) of a monopsonist firm in full knowledge of the underlying stochastic process (an infinite-
horizon Markov chain). In the present model, by contrast, the monopolist does not know the buyer’s
current valuation (low or high) and which of a continuum of two-period processes (λ ∈ [0, 1]) may
have generated it.
In Kennan’s model, the monopolist may use a screening offer in order to learn the buyer’s current
valuation and hence, the state of the process. In the present model, the seller may make an offer that
3See, for example, Laffont and Tirole (1988), and especially Hart and Tirole (1988).
4See, for example, Acquisti and Varian (2002), Taylor (2003), Shaffer and Zhang (2000), Fudenberg and Tirole
(2000), and Villas Boas (1999).
5See Krugman (2000) and Streitfield (2000).
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reveals the buyer’s first-period valuation and allows her to update her beliefs about the underlying
process but not to learn it with certainty. In Kennan’s model, the seller eventually opts to separate
types with a screening offer, while the monopolist in the present model seldom makes separating
offers. Interestingly, in both Kennan’s model and the present one, the monopolist sometimes makes
equilibrium price offers strictly below the minimum valuation of the buyer. In both models, this
occurs in order to preempt signaling by a low-value buyer who would reject an offer equal to his
valuation. Such signaling would provide valuable information to the monopolist, but the value of
the information obtained would not offset the reduced probability of making a current sale.
The infinite-horizon setting of persistent private information studied by Kennan allows him to
uncover some interesting and important dynamic effects outside the scope of this investigation. The
two-dimensional private information with a permanent component analyzed here, however, adheres
more closely to the traditional experimental pricing paradigm where the focus is on learning the
structural parameters underlying a noisy demand process.6
The model is presented in the next section. In Section 3, the bench-mark setting of a non-strategic
buyer is characterized. The analysis at the core of the paper is presented in Section 4, where the
first-period expected demand of a strategic buyer is derived. Sections 5 and 6 deal respectively with
the best and worst equilibria for the seller and contain most of the economic results. Some brief
concluding remarks are presented in Section 7. Proofs not appearing in the text have been relegated
to Appendix A (lemmas and theorems) and Appendix B (examples).7
2 The Model
There are two risk-neutral players, a seller (S, she) and a buyer (B, he). In each period t = 1, 2,
B demands one unit of a good which S may produce and sell to him. S’s production cost is
normalized to zero. B’s valuation for the good in period t, vt, equals 1 (a convenient normalization)
with probability λ and equals ν with probability 1 − λ, ν ∈ (0, 1). The demand parameter λ can
be thought of as representing B’s income or an underlying preference parameter. It is itself the
realization of a random variable which is continuously distributed on [0, 1] with probability density
function f(λ). Let E[λ] denote the expected value of λ under this prior.
At the beginning of the game, B privately observes λ and v1, and he privately observes v2 at
the beginning of the second period. Hence, in any given period, B’s “type” has two components, a
permanent structural component λ ∈ [0, 1] and a noisy transitory component vt ∈ {ν, 1}.8
6In a recent working paper, Battaglini (2004) also studies a related setting in which a firm has a long-term relation-
ship with a customer whose demand parameter is determined over time by a Markov process. Battaglini’s findings,
however, differ markedly from those presented here, primarily because he considers a setting with full-commitment in
which the buyer completely reveals his private information at the outset of the relationship.
7Appendix B was included for the convenience of referees, but not intended for a publication.
8While B’s type is multi-dimensional, the focus here is on pricing without commitment rather than on an optimal
monopolistic screening mechanism (e.g., Armstrong 1996, Rochet and Chone 1998).
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In each period t = 1, 2, B and S play an extensive-form game with the following stages.
1. B observes his valuation vt ∈ {ν, 1}.
2. S announces price pt ∈ <+ at which she is willing to sell the good to B.
3. B either accepts (qt = 1) or rejects (qt = 0) S’s offer.
4. B’s (contemporaneous) payoff is qt(vt − pt), and S’s payoff is qtpt.
For ease of exposition, there is assumed to be no discounting.9
Note that while this game has a recursive structure, it is not a repeated game due to the presence
of asymmetric information. Specifically, S updates her prior beliefs about λ from the first period to
the second.
Let hS ≡ (p1, q1) be the history of first-period events observed by S, and let hB ≡ (λ, v1, p1, q1) be
the history of first-period events observed by B at the beginning of period 2. A behavior strategy for
S is a pair of probability distributions, (Φ1(p1),Φ2(p2;hS)), over all possible price offers. Similarly, a
behavior strategy for B is a pair of functions, (γ1(λ, v1, p1), γ2(v2, p2;hB)), where γt is the probability
that B accepts S’s offer in period t.
Let f(λ|hS) denote S’s posterior beliefs about λ at the beginning of period 2. Likewise, let
E[λ|hS ] denote her updated expectation. The solution concept employed is efficient perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE); i.e., a PBE in which indifference about pricing or purchasing is resolved in favor
of efficiency. (Since inefficient PBEs occur only for a non-generic set of parameters, the efficiency
criterion is fairly innocuous and is suppressed in the discussion below.)
Observe that in the second period, B optimally accepts any price that does not exceed his
valuation regardless of the history. Given this, S will either price at 1 and sell with probability
E[λ|hS ], or she will price at ν and sell with probability one. This is stated formally in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 (Second-Period Equilibrium Behavior) In any PBE, B’s strategy in period 2 is
γ2(v2, p2;hB) =
{
1, if v2 ≥ p2
0, if v2 < p2.
Also, in any PBE, Φ2(p2;hS) is a two-point distribution. Specifically, S offers p2 = ν with probability
θ(hS) and p2 = 1 with probability 1− θ(hS) according to
θ(hS) =

0, if ν < E[λ|hS ]
some θ ∈ [0, 1], if ν = E[λ|hS ]
1, if ν > [λ|hS ].
9Discounting does not change the results qualitatively, but it complicates the analysis by adding a “kink” to
expected first-period demand.
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With this lemma in hand, it is possible to derive first-period equilibrium pricing and purchasing
behavior, which is the focus of the ensuing sections.
3 The Classic Non-Strategic Buyer Setting
In this section, the seller’s problem when facing a non-strategic buyer originally analyzed by Roth-
schild (1974) is recast in the simple two-period two-valuation framework of the current paper. In
the next section, the straightforward solution to this problem is shown to contrast sharply with the
case of a strategic buyer.
Formally, suppose – as in Rothschild (1974) – that S faces two stochastically equivalent (i.e., λ
is the same), but distinct buyers, B1 and B2, who arrive sequentially. In this case, S learns about
the demand parameter of B2 by observing the purchasing behavior of B1.
Denote by E the expected value of λ given v1 = ν, and E the expected value of λ given v1 = 1.
Straightforward calculations yield
E ≡ E[λ|v1 = ν] =
E[λ]−E [λ2]
1− E[λ]
and
E ≡ E[λ|v1 = 1] =
E
[
λ2
]
E[λ]
.
Observe that E < E[λ] < E.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium with a Non-Strategic Buyer) In any PBE, Bt accepts if and
only if vt ≥ pt. Equilibrium prices are given by:
(i) p1 = p2 = 1, if ν < E;
(ii) p1 = 1 and p2 = q1 + (1− q1)ν, if ν ∈ [E, ν ′);
(iii) p1 = p2 = ν, if ν ≥ ν ′,
where
ν ′ ≡ E[λ] + E
[
λ2
]
1 + E[λ]
.
Obviously, Bt will purchase the good if and only if the price does not exceed his valuation. Given
this, S would never charge pt 6= ν or 1. Note, however, that pricing at ν in the first period provides
no information about the demand parameter λ because B1 always accepts this offer. Pricing at 1
does reveal information because B1 accepts if and only if v1 = 1.
S finds it optimal to charge 1 in both periods if ν is low enough, and she charges ν in both periods
if it is sufficiently high. In the intermediate range, ν ∈ [E, ν ′), S charges 1 in the first period, p2 = 1
following acceptance and p2 = ν following rejection. When ν ∈ (E[λ], ν ′), S experiments by setting
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p1 = 1. That is, her first-period payoff would be maximized at p1 = ν, but she opts to set p1 = 1
in order to obtain information about B2’s demand parameter, λ. It is straightforward to verify that
this price experimentation lowers expected social surplus; i.e., the value of the information obtained
by S is less than the concomitant loss in expected consumer surplus. In order to focus on settings
where information is potentially valuable to S, the following necessary condition is assumed to hold
throughout the remainder of the paper:
E < ν < E.
4 The Strategic Buyer Setting
In this section, the case of a single buyer, B, who is interested in buying one unit of the good in
each period is investigated. In particular, B’s first-period equilibrium behavior on the continuation
game following any price offer p1 is derived.
From Lemma 1, the expected payoff to B from accepting an offer of p1 is
v1 − p1 + λθ(p1, 1)(1− ν),
and his expected payoff from rejecting is
λθ(p1, 0)(1− ν).
This simple observation serves as proof of the following claim.
Lemma 2 (Dynamic Incentives) In any PBE, B accepts p1 if and only if
v1 − p1 ≥ λ(θ(p1, 0)− θ(p1, 1))(1− ν).
Next, note that in any PBE, it must be the case that E[λ|p1, q1] is derived from B’s first-period
behavior given θ(p1, q1), and θ(p1, q1) is optimal for S given E[λ|p1, q1]. This interdependence
between optimal actions and beliefs gives rise to the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Beliefs and Actions) Let D1(p1) denote the probability S assigns to acceptance of her
first-period offer. In any PBE, if D1(p1) ∈ (0, 1), then
E[λ|p1, 1] ≥ E[λ|p1, 0],
θ(p1, 1) ≤ θ(p1, 0).
Intuitively, since B is more likely to accept when v1 = 1, S’s beliefs about λ should be higher when
she observes q1 = 1 than when she observes q1 = 0.
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The following result is proven by applying Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Corollary 1 (Honest Rejections) In any PBE, B always rejects p1 > v1.
The next step is to determine when B with v1 = 1 accepts an offer of p1 ∈ (ν, 1]. Lemmas 2 and
3 indicate that B with high λ has the most to gain from strategically rejecting such an offer (i.e.,
from pooling with B’s possessing v1 = ν). Hence, suppose that B with v1 = 1 accepts p1 ∈ (ν, 1] if
and only if λ ≤ µ for some µ ∈ [0, 1]. Then the expected value of λ conditional on acceptance is
α(µ) ≡ E[λ|v1 = 1 ∩ λ ≤ µ] =
∫ µ
0 λ
2f(λ) dλ∫ µ
0 λf(λ) dλ
,
and the expected value of λ conditional on rejection is
ρ(µ) ≡ E[λ|{v1 = ν} ∪ {v1 = 1 ∩ λ > µ}] =
E[λ]− ∫ µ0 λ2f(λ) dλ
1− ∫ µ0 λf(λ) dλ .
These functions have some important properties which are summarized in the following technical
lemma.
Lemma 4 (Geometric Properties of α and ρ) Functions α and ρ possess the following prop-
erties:
(i) α starts at α(0) = 0 and increases monotonically until it ends at α(1) = E.
(ii) ρ starts at ρ(0) = E[λ], increases until it crosses the 45-degree line, and then decreases until it
ends at ρ(1) = E.
(iii) α and ρ cross once, and at their intersection, mmin, α(mmin) = ρ(mmin) = E[λ].
Lemma 4 implies that there exists a unique number m ∈ [mmin, 1) defined as follows:
m ≡
{
ρ−1(ν), if ν ∈ (E,E[λ])
α−1(ν), if ν ∈ [E[λ], E).
In Figure 1, m is shown for the case ν ∈ (E[λ], E).
Given m, define the constant
p ≡ 1−m(1− ν).
For any p1 ∈ (ν, p], the next result establishes that the marginal type for B that accepts when v1 = 1
is given by the function
µ(p1) ≡ 1− p11− ν .
Observe that µ(p1) is monotone decreasing with µ(ν) = 1 and µ(p) = m.
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Figure 1: Geometric Properties of α and ρ
0 mmin m 1 µ
E
E[λ]
ν
E
1
α(µ)
ρ(µ)
45◦
Lemma 5 (Strategic Rejections) Suppose v1 = 1. In any PBE, the following must hold:
(i) If p1 ∈ (ν, p], then B accepts the price if and only if λ ≤ µ(p1). S sets p2 = 1 following acceptance
(θ(p1, 1) = 0) and p2 = ν following rejection (θ(p1, 0) = 1).
(ii) If p1 ∈ (p, 1], then B accepts the price if and only if λ ≤ m. When ν < E[λ], S sets p2 =
1 following acceptance (θ(p1, 1) = 0) and randomizes between ν and 1 following rejection
according to
θ(p1, 0) =
1− p1
m(1− ν) .
When ν > E[λ], S sets p2 = ν following rejection (θ(p1, 0) = 1) and randomizes between ν and
1 following acceptance according to
θ(p1, 1) = 1− 1− p1
m(1− ν) .
To understand this result, first consider p1 ∈ (ν, p]. Given that B accepts p1 if and only if v1 = 1
and λ ≤ µ(p1), S updates her beliefs: E[λ|p1, 1] = α(µ(p1)) ≥ ν and E[λ|p1, 0] = ρ(µ(p1)) ≤ ν.
Hence, S optimally sets p2 = 1 following acceptance and p2 = ν following rejection.
Notice that “reverse screening” occurs over this range in the sense that high prices induce
rejection by high long-run types. Indeed, as p1 increases, the “marginal” type, µ(p1), falls and the
set of types willing to accept shrinks. Acceptance and rejection, therefore, become less informative
(i.e., α−ρ gets smaller). Once p1 = p, further increases in p1 cannot induce more strategic rejection
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because acceptance would otherwise indicate a sufficiently low value of λ that S would prefer to
set p2 = ν. In particular, for p1 ∈ (p, 1], the marginal type must remain at m. This requires S to
randomize between p2 = ν and p2 = 1 in order to keep B with v1 = 1 and λ = m indifferent between
accepting and rejecting p1.
To complete the characterization of equilibrium play for B, it remains to consider p1 ≤ ν. The
analysis over this range, however, is more complicated because B’s equilibrium behavior is not
unique. In particular, there exists a lower bound p such that B accepts in any PBE if p1 ≤ p.
For any p1 ∈ (p, ν], however, either pooling or signaling may occur in equilibrium. To illustrate
this, the two extreme equilibria that involve minimal signaling (i.e., all types accept p1 ≤ ν) and
maximal signaling (i.e., strategic rejections by some types for all p1 ∈ (p, ν]) are derived. For ease
of exposition, these equilibria are called (using S’s perspective) respectively the Good PBE and the
Bad PBE, with the understanding that they actually bracket a continuum of intermediate cases. In
particular, an Intermediate PBE obtains if the Good PBE holds for some proper subset of prices
p1 ∈ (p, ν] and the bad PBE holds for the complementary subset of prices in this range.
Interestingly, B’s behavior in the Bad PBE for prices p1 ∈ (p, ν] is the mirror image of his
behavior for prices in (ν, p]. Specifically, for p1 ∈ (ν, p], strategic rejections conceal information
through pooling. On the other hand, for p1 ∈ (p, ν], it is shown below that strategic rejections reveal
information through signaling.
The following result is proven by applying Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
Corollary 2 (Honest Acceptances) In any PBE, B with v1 = 1 always accepts p1 ≤ ν.
The next step is to determine when B with v1 = ν accepts p1 ≤ ν. Lemmas 2 and 3 indicate that
B with high λ has the most to gain from strategically rejecting such an offer (i.e., from separating
from B’s possessing v1 = 1). Hence, suppose that B with v1 = ν accepts p1 ≤ ν if and only if λ ≤ µ̂
for some µ̂ ∈ [0, 1]. Then the expected value of λ conditional on acceptance is
α̂ (µ̂) ≡ E[λ|{v1 = 1} ∪ {v1 = ν ∩ λ ≤ µ̂}] =
E[λ]− ∫ 1bµ λ(1− λ)f(λ) dλ
1− ∫ 1bµ (1− λ)f(λ) dλ ,
and the expected value of λ conditional on rejection is
ρ̂(µ̂) ≡ E[λ|v1 = ν ∩ λ > µ̂] =
∫ 1bµ λ(1− λ)f(λ) dλ∫ 1bµ (1− λ)f(λ) dλ .
These functions have some important properties which are summarized in the following technical
lemma.
Lemma 6 (Geometric Properties of α̂ and ρ̂) Functions α̂ and ρ̂ possess the following prop-
erties:
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Figure 2: Geometric Properties of α̂ and ρ̂
0 m̂ m̂max 1 µ̂
E
E[λ]
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1
α̂(µ̂)
ρ̂(µ̂)
45◦
(i) α̂ starts at α̂(0) = E, decreases until it crosses the 45-degree line, and then increases until it
ends at α̂(1) = E[λ].
(ii) ρ̂ starts at ρ̂(0) = E and increases monotonically until it ends at ρ(1) = 1.
(iii) α̂ and ρ̂ cross once, and at their intersection, m̂max, α̂(m̂max) = ρ̂(m̂max) = E[λ].
Lemma 6 implies that there exists a unique number m̂ ∈ (0, m̂max] defined as follows:
m̂ ≡
{
ρ̂−1(ν), if ν ∈ (E,E[λ])
α̂−1(ν), if ν ∈ [E[λ], E).
In Figure 2, m̂ is shown for the case ν ∈ (E[λ], E).
Given m̂, define the constant
p ≡ ν − m̂(1− ν).
For any p1 ∈ (p, ν] the next result establishes that the marginal type for B that accepts in the Bad
PBE when v1 = ν is given by the function
µ̂(p1) ≡ ν − p11− ν .
Observe that µ̂(p1) is monotone decreasing with µ̂(p) = m̂ and µ̂(ν) = 0.
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Lemma 7 (The Good PBE and the Bad PBE) Suppose v1 = ν. There is a Good PBE in
which B always accepts p1 ≤ ν, S sets p2 = 1 (θ(p1, 1) = 0) if ν < E[λ] and p2 = ν (θ(p1, 1) = 0) if
ν > E[λ]. There is also a Bad PBE in which the following holds:
(i) If p1 ∈ (p, ν], then B accepts if and only if λ ≤ µ̂(p1). S sets p2 = 1 following acceptance
(θ(p1, 1) = 0) and p2 = ν following rejection (θ(p1, 0) = 1).
(ii) If p1 ≤ p, then B always accepts the price. S sets p2 = 1 (θ(p1, 1) = 0) if ν < E[λ] and p2 = ν
(θ(p1, 1) = 1) if ν > E[λ].
To understand the Bad PBE, first consider p1 ∈ (p, ν]. Given that B rejects if and only if v1 = ν
and λ > µ̂(p1), S updates her beliefs: E[λ|p1, 0] = ρ̂(µ̂(p1)) ≤ ν and E[λ|p1, 1] = α̂(µ̂(p1)) ≥ ν.
Hence, S optimally sets p2 = ν following rejection and p2 = 1 following acceptance.
Notice that as p1 falls, µ̂(p1) increases and the set of long-run types willing to strategically reject
shrinks. Acceptance and rejection, therefore, become less informative (i.e., α̂− ρ̂ gets smaller). For
p1 ≤ p, signaling is not possible because rejection would indicate a sufficiently high value of λ that
S would prefer to set p2 = 1. Lemma 7 shows that any p1 ≤ p must induce acceptance by all types
of B in any PBE.
With Lemmas 2 through 7 in hand, it is possible to formulate the expected first-period demand
by B and the expected values of λ conditional on acceptance and rejection of the first-period price.
Proposition 2 (Expected First-Period Demand and Posterior Beliefs) The probability that
B accepts p1 and the expected values of λ conditional on acceptance/rejection of p1 are as follows:
(i) If p1 > 1, then D1(p1) = 0 and E[λ|p1, 0] = E[λ].
(ii) If p1 ∈ (p, 1], then D1(p1) =
∫m
0 λf(λ) dλ and
E[λ|p1, q1] =
{
α(m), if q1 = 1
ρ(m), if q1 = 0.
(iii) If p1 ∈ (ν, p], then D1(p1) =
∫ µ(p1)
0 λf(λ) dλ and
E[λ|p1, q1] =
{
α(µ(p1)), if q1 = 1
ρ(µ(p1)), if q1 = 0.
(iv) If p1 ≤ ν and the Good PBE obtains, then D1(p1) = 1 and E[λ|p1, 1] = E[λ]. If the Bad PBE
obtains, then
D1(p1) =
{
1− ∫ 1bµ(p1)(1− λ)f(λ) dλ, if p1 ∈ (p, ν]
1, if p1 ≤ p
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and
E[λ|p1, q1] =

α̂(µ̂(p1)), if q1 = 1 and p1 ∈ (p, ν]
ρ̂(µ̂(p1)), if q1 = 0 and p1 ∈ (p, ν]
E[λ], if q1 = 1 and p1 ≤ p.
Note that the strategic rejections in the Bad PBE for p1 ∈ (p, ν] and in all PBE for p1 ∈ (ν, 1]
imply thatD1(p1) is strictly lower than the expected demand of a non-strategic buyer at these prices.
In particular, Proposition 1 indicates that a non-strategic buyer accepts p1 ≤ ν with probability
one and accepts p1 ∈ (ν, 1] with probability E[λ]. Since strategic rejections also impede learning, it
follows immediately that S is weakly worse off when facing a strategic buyer.
S’s continuation payoff from offering p1 to a strategic buyer is
ΠS(p1) = D1(p1)(p1 +max{E[λ|p1, 1], ν}) + (1−D1(p1))max{E[λ|p1, 0], ν}.
The final step in deriving a PBE of the entire game is to determine the value of p1 that maximizes
ΠS(p1). Of course, the solution to this problem depends on what PBE obtains for continuation
games with p1 ≤ ν. The Good and the Bad PBE are investigated respectively in the next two
sections.
5 The Good Equilibrium
In this section, the Good PBE in which B always accepts first-period offers p1 ≤ ν is fully charac-
terized. The main finding is that in this equilibrium, S never offers a first-period price that yields
her valuable information about B’s structural demand parameter, λ.
To ease notation, for any µ ∈ [0, 1], define
I(µ) ≡
∫ µ
0
λf(λ) dλ.
First, suppose S is considering offering p1 ∈ (p, 1]. Observe that the marginal type m that
accepts such an offer is calibrated so that the value of the information conveyed to S is zero. In
particular, if ν > E[λ], then
E[λ|p1, 1] = α(m) = ν > ρ(m) = E[λ|p1, 0].
Thus, charging p2 = ν (which is optimal under the prior) maximizes S’s expected second-period
return following a first-period acceptance and rejection. On the other hand, if ν < E[λ], then
E[λ|p1, 1] = α(m) > ν = ρ(m) = E[λ|p1, 0].
14
Thus, charging p2 = 1 (which is optimal under the prior) maximizes S’s expected second-period
return following a first-period acceptance and rejection. Hence, S’s continuation payoff from offering
p1 ∈ (p, 1] can be written as
ΠS(p1) = I(m)p1 +max{E[λ], ν},
which is maximized at p1 = 1.
Second, suppose S is considering offering p1 ∈ (ν, p]. The information conveyed by B’s purchasing
decision is valuable to S for prices in this range because
E[λ|p1, 1] = α(µ(p1)) ≥ ν ≥ ρ(µ(p1)) = E[λ|p1, 0].
In the second period, S optimally sets p2 = 1 following acceptance and p2 = ν following rejection.
Hence, her continuation payoff is
ΠS(p1) = I(µ(p1))(p1 + E[λ|p1, 1]) + (1− I(µ(p1)))ν.
Finally, suppose S is considering offering p1 ≤ ν. Since B always accepts such an offer, S’s
continuation payoff is
ΠS(p1) = p1 +max{E[λ], ν},
which is maximized at p1 = ν.
Summarizing the above, in the Good PBE, S charges some p1 ∈ {1, ν}∪ (ν, p), depending on the
primitives of the model, ν and f(λ). In fact, Propositions 3 and 4 below show that S never sets a
first-period price p1 ∈ (ν, p) that yields valuable information.
Proposition 3 (Optimal Prices when Beliefs are Pessimistic) Suppose ν ≥ E[λ]. Then, S
offers p1 = p2 = ν in the Good PBE.
Recall from Proposition 1 that when B is not strategic, it is optimal for S to experiment by
charging p1 = 1 if ν ∈ [E[λ], ν ′). When B is strategic, however, S runs a substantially increased risk
that he will reject any offer p1 > ν. Specifically, for any informative offer p1 ∈ (ν, p), Proposition 3
shows that the information rent S must yield to B dominates the value of the information obtained,
and S, therefore, opts not to experiment. Since S learns nothing by setting p1 = ν in the Good
PBE, she also sets p2 = ν when her initial beliefs are pessimistic. This, of course, maximizes welfare
because B buys the good in both periods with probability one.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Prices when Beliefs are Optimistic) Suppose ν < E[λ]. Then in
the Good PBE:
(i) If ν < ν′′, S offers p1 = p2 = 1.
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(ii) If ν ∈ [ν ′′, E[λ]), S offers p1 = ν and p2 = 1,
where ν ′′ is implicitly defined by
I
(
ρ−1
(
ν ′′
))
= ν ′′.
The story behind this result is similar to the previous one. The information rent outweighs the
value of the information obtained, and S, therefore, prefers prices that yield no valuable information.
In the Good PBE, there are two potentially optimal prices for which this is true, p1 = ν and p1 = 1.
Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that S always sets one of these prices, and hence, she never obtains
valuable information about B’s demand parameter λ from his first-period purchasing decision.
Proposition 4 indicates that if ν < E[λ], then S always sets p2 = 1 on the equilibrium path.
The fact that she is not committed to do this, however, causes serious erosion in her first-period
expected profit. If S could commit to offer p2 = 1, then B would not strategically reject offers of
p1 = 1. This would raise S’s profit whenever ν < E[λ] and would raise total welfare when ν < ν′′.
Finally, while it seems plausible that S might be able to commit not to raise prices, a commitment
not to lower them is not renegotiation proof. Note, however, that it is the commitment not to lower
prices that has strategic value to S when ν < E[λ]. In particular, if S commits to p2 = 1 and B
rejects p1 = 1, then S regrets her commitment to a high second-period price (and so does B).
6 The Bad Equilibrium
In this section, the Bad PBE described in Lemma 7 is investigated. While it is not possible to provide
a full characterization for this equilibrium, some general results are obtained. Also, two examples are
presented that illustrate a variety of first-period equilibrium pricing behavior. Specifically, Example
1 shows that – unlike in the Good PBE – S may offer a first-period price that reveals valuable
information about B’s demand parameter. Example 2, however, shows that this is not necessarily
the case and that S may even elect to set the uninformative first-period price p1 = p which is less
than B’s lowest possible valuation for the good, ν.
To ease notation, for any µ̂ ∈ [0, 1], define
Î(µ̂) ≡ 1−
∫ 1
bµ (1− λ)f(λ) dλ.
For first-period prices p1 > ν, B’s purchasing behavior and S’s expected profit are the same in
the Good and the Bad PBE. Suppose S is considering offering p1 ∈ (p, ν]. The information revealed
by B’s purchasing decision over this range of prices is valuable to S in the Bad PBE. Specifically,
in the second period, S optimally sets p2 = 1 following acceptance and p2 = ν following rejection
because
E[λ|p1, 1] = α̂(µ̂(p1)) > ν > ρ̂(µ̂(p1)) = E[λ|p1, 0].
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Given this, S’s continuation payoff from offering p1 ∈ (p, ν] is
ΠS(p1) = Î(µ̂(p1))(p1 + α̂(µ̂(p1))) +
(
1− Î(µ̂(p1))
)
ν.
Finally, suppose S is considering offering p1 ≤ p. Since B always accepts such an offer, S’s
continuation payoff is
ΠS(p1) = p1 +max{E[λ], ν},
which is obviously maximized at p1 = p.
Summarizing the above, in the Bad PBE, S charges some p1 ∈ {p, 1} ∪ (p, p), depending on the
primitives of the model, ν and f(λ). Before exploring S’s first-period pricing decision any further,
it is worth establishing that the Bad PBE is indeed bad from S’s perspective.
Proposition 5 (The Bad PBE v.s. the Good PBE) The expected payoff to S is (weakly) lower
in the Bad PBE than in the Good PBE.
This result is easily understood. For p1 > ν, S’s continuation payoff ΠS(p1) is the same in the
Bad PBE and in the Good one. Also, S does strictly worse by offering p1 = p in the Bad PBE than
by offering p1 = ν in the Good one because p < ν and B purchases with probability one in both
cases. The only remaining question is whether S can do better by charging an informative price
p1 ∈ (p, ν] in the Bad PBE than by charging the uninformative price p1 = ν in the Good one. It
turns out that the value of the information obtained by charging p1 ∈ (p, ν] in the Bad PBE never
makes up for the lower probability of sale, and hence, S does strictly worse at these prices.
Propositions 3 and 4 of the previous section established that S never sets an informative first-
period price in the Good PBE. The following example shows that this is not true for the Bad
PBE.
Example 1 (Maximal Learning) Suppose F (λ) = 1−√1− λ. In this case, E[λ] = 2/3, E = 2/5
and E = 4/5. Consider “neutral” beliefs, ν = E[λ] = 2/3. Then, m̂ = m̂max = 4/9 and m = mmin <
0.91.
As discussed above, one of three situations is optimal for S in the Bad PBE: either she sets an
informative first-period price p1 ∈ (p, p), or she sets the uninformative low price p1 = p, or she sets
the uninformative high price p1 = 1.
Straightforward algebra shows that S’s continuation payoff over p1 ∈ (p, p) is maximized at
p1 = ν. B accepts p1 = ν if and only if v1 = 1. This corresponds to full separation, E[λ|ν, 0] = E
and E[λ|ν, 1] = E. In the second period, S, therefore, offers p2 = q1+(1−q1)ν. Hence, her expected
payoff from p1 = ν is
ΠS(ν) = E[λ]
(
ν + E
)
+ (1− E[λ])ν = 6
5
.
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Next, note that
p = ν − m̂(1− ν) = 14/27.
B always accepts p1 = p. Since S learns nothing, she is content to set p2 = ν. Hence, her expected
payoff from p1 = p is
ΠS(p) = p+ ν =
32
27
<
6
5
.
Finally, if S charges p1 = 1, then B accepts when v1 = 1 and λ ≤ m. The information conveyed
by B’s purchasing decision has no value to S, so she is content to offer p2 = ν in the second period.
Hence, her expected payoff from p1 = 1 is
ΠS(1) = I(m) + ν < I(0.91) +
2
3
=
3127
3000
<
6
5
.
It is, therefore, optimal for S to offer p1 = ν, and maximal learning occurs on the equilibrium
path.
The next proposition demonstrates that the Bad PBE may be either worse or better for B than
the Good PBE depending on parameter values. In particular, the set of parameters for which S sets
p1 = 1 is larger in the Bad PBE. On the other hand, there exist parameter values for which S finds
it optimal to induce complete pooling by setting a price lower than ν, something she would never
do in the Good PBE.
Proposition 6 (Prices in the Bad PBE) Suppose the Bad PBE obtains, then:
(i) There exists ² > 0 such that if ν < ν ′′ + ², then S offers p1 = p2 = 1.
(ii) There exists ξ > 0 such that if ν > E − ξ, then S offers p1 = p and p2 = ν.
Recall from Proposition 4 that when ν < ν ′′, S charges p1 = 1 in the Good PBE. This price also
maximizes S’s continuation payoff in this region of the parameter space when the Bad PBE obtains.
Indeed, since charging p1 = ν is strictly worse for S in the Bad PBE, the region over which it is
optimal for her to set p1 = 1 is somewhat larger; i.e., ν < ν ′′ + ².
The most striking aspect of Proposition 6 is that if beliefs are sufficiently pessimistic, then it is
optimal for S to set a first period price of p, which is always strictly less than B’s valuation for the
good. Specifically, as ν approaches E: the value of any information S can obtain goes to zero; p
goes to ν; and the probability that B accepts p1 ∈ (p, ν] goes to E[λ] < 1. When ν is sufficiently
close to E, S, therefore, prefers to sell at p with certainty rather than at a marginally higher price
with significantly lower probability.
Proposition 6 shows that for arbitrary beliefs, F (λ), there exist values of ν for which S sets an
uninformative first-period price (either p1 = 1 or p1 = p) in the Bad PBE. The following example
demonstrates that there exist prior beliefs, F (λ), such that S sets an uninformative first-period price
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for any value of ν ∈ (E,E). The example also illustrates that p1 = p does not require ν to be close
to E or even pessimistic beliefs.
Example 2 (No Learning) Suppose F (λ) = λ (the uniform distribution). In this case, E[λ] =
1/2, E = 1/3 and E = 2/3. In Appendix B it is shown that when beliefs are pessimistic, ν ∈
[1/2, 2/3), then S’s continuation payoff is maximized at p1 = p. When beliefs are optimistic, ν ∈
(1/3, 1/2), then there exists ν ′′′ such that S offers p1 = 1 if ν ∈ (1/3, ν ′′′), and she offers p1 = p if
ν ∈ [ν ′′′, 1/2). In other words, learning does not occur on the equilibrium path for any value of ν.
7 Conclusion
This paper investigated a new wrinkle in an old question. In particular, it built on the monopoly
price-experimentation literature pioneered by Rothschild (1974) by considering the impact of strate-
gic buyers on the ability of firms to learn about demand. When market demand is composed of
many anonymous individuals or when each individual purchases the good only once, strategic con-
siderations are not relevant. Increasingly, however, firms are able to use innovations in information
technology to track customers and make them personalized offers that depend on their history of
prior purchases. In such settings, consumers have incentives to manipulate the beliefs of sellers in
order to induce them to offer low prices.
In the context of the model presented above, it was shown that a buyer may strategically reject a
seller’s first-period offer for one of two reasons. First, in order to conceal information (i.e., to pool),
a high-valuation buyer may reject high prices that would never be accepted by a low-valuation
buyer. Second, in order to reveal information (i.e., to signal), a low-valuation buyer may reject low
prices that would always be accepted by a high-value buyer. Given this behavior, the seller often
finds it optimal to post prices that generate no useful information. Indeed, in the Good equilibrium
(where there is no signaling), it was shown that the seller never charges a first-period price that
yields valuable information. Learning may occur, however, in the Bad equilibrium (where there is
maximal signaling). Nevertheless, the scope for learning by the seller appears to be quite limited
even in this case. Indeed, it was shown that in order to preempt signaling, in the Bad equilibrium
the seller may actually set a first-period price strictly below the buyer’s lowest possible valuation.
The model presented here is probably the simplest one in which learning by a monopolist in
the context of a strategic buyer can be meaningfully addressed. It would, therefore, be interesting
both theoretically and practically to explore the robustness of the findings presented here to other
specifications such as longer time horizons or more sophisticated parameterizations of demand.
While such generalizations will undoubtedly involve serious technical hurdles, the value of such
research appears large and growing.
19
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: Bt accepts if and only if pt ≤ vt. Given this, S would never charge
pt 6= ν or 1.
Case 1: ν < E. If S sets p1 = 1, then the expected values of λ conditional on acceptance and
rejection are E and E, respectively. In either case, S sets p2 = 1 by Lemma 1. On the other
hand, if S sets p1 = ν, then the expected value of λ conditional on acceptance is E[λ], and
the expected value conditional on rejection is immaterial since rejection does not occur in
equilibrium. Hence, S sets p2 = 1. It is optimal for S to set p1 = p2 = 1 rather than p1 = ν
and p2 = 1 since
2E[λ] > ν + E[λ]
holds for ν < E.
Case 2: ν ∈ [E,E[λ]). If S sets p1 = 1, then she optimally sets p2 = ν following rejection and
p2 = 1 following acceptance. On the other hand, if S sets p1 = ν, then she optimally sets
p2 = 1. It is optimal for S to charge p1 = 1 and p2 = q1 + (1 − q1)ν rather than p1 = ν and
p2 = 1 since
E[λ]
(
1 + E
)
+ (1−E[λ])ν > ν + E[λ]
holds for ν ∈ [E,E[λ]).
Case 3: ν ∈ [E[λ], E). If S sets p1 = 1, then she optimally sets p2 = ν following rejection and
p2 = 1 following acceptance. On the other hand, if S sets p1 = ν, then she optimally sets
p2 = ν. It is optimal for S to charge p1 = 1 and p2 = q1 + (1− q1)ν rather than p1 = p2 = ν if
and only if
E[λ]
(
1 + E
)
+ (1− E[λ])ν > 2ν,
or
ν < ν′.
Case 4: ν ≥ E. If S sets p1 = 1, then she optimally sets p2 = ν following rejection as well as
acceptance. On the other hand, if S sets p1 = ν, then she optimally sets p2 = ν. It is optimal
for S to charge p1 = p2 = ν rather than p1 = 1 and p2 = ν since
2ν > E[λ] + ν
holds for ν ≥ E. 2
Proof of Lemma 3: The proof consists of 3 steps.
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Step 1. By way of contradiction, suppose θ(p1, 1) = θ(p1, 0) and E[λ|p1, 1] < E[λ|p1, 0]. Lemma 2
implies the following:
1. If p1 > 1, then B always rejects the first-period offer. D1(p1) = 0 in this case.
2. If p1 ∈ (ν, 1], then B accepts if and only if v1 = 1. Hence, E[λ|p1, 1] = E > E[λ|p1, 0] = E,
which contradicts the supposition.
3. If p1 ≤ ν, then B always accepts the first-period offer. D1(p1) = 1 in this case.
Step 2. By way of contradiction, suppose θ(p1, 1) > θ(p1, 0). Lemma 2 implies the following:
1. If p1 > 1, then B accepts if and only if v1 = 1 and λ ≥ λ′, where
λ′ =
p1 − 1
(θ(p1, 1)− θ(p1, 0))(1− ν) .
(If calculated λ′ ≥ 1, then B always rejects the first-period offer, D1(p1) = 0.) Hence,
E[λ|p1, 1] ≥ E > E[λ] ≥ E[λ|p1, 0]. This along with Lemma 1 implies that θ(p1, 1) = 0 ≤
θ(p1, 0) must hold, which contradicts the supposition.
2. If p1 ∈ (ν, 1], then B rejects if and only if v1 = ν and λ < λ′, where
λ′ =
p1 − ν
(φ(p1, 1)− φ(p1, 0))(1− ν) .
(If calculated λ′ ≥ 1, then B accepts p1 if and only if v1 = 1.) Hence, E[λ|p1, 1] ≥ E[λ] >
E ≥ E[λ|p1, 0]. This along with Lemma 1 implies that θ(p1, 1) ≤ θ(p1, 0) = 1 must hold,
which contradicts the supposition.
3. If p1 ≤ ν, then B always accepts the first-period offer. D1(p1) = 1 in this case.
Step 3. By way of contradiction, suppose θ(p1, 1) 6= θ(p1, 0) and E[λ|p1, 1] < E[λ|p1, 0]. This
implies either E[λ|p1, 1] < ν ≤ E[λ|p1, 0] or E[λ|p1, 1] ≤ ν < E[λ|p1, 0]. Thus, it must be
θ(p1, 1) > θ(p1, 0), which cannot happen in equilibrium by Step 2. 2
Proof of Lemma 4: Each part is proven in turn.
(i) Differentiating α gives
α′(µ) =
µf(µ)
∫ µ
0 (µ− λ)λf(λ) dλ
(
∫ µ
0 λf(λ) dλ)
2
.
This is strictly positive for µ > 0.
(ii) Differentiating ρ gives
ρ′(µ) =
µf(µ)[(E[λ]− ∫ µ0 λ2f(λ) dλ)− µ(1− ∫ µ0 λf(λ) dλ)]
(1− ∫ µ0 λf(λ) dλ)2 .
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This is positive for sufficiently small µ > 0. Hence, ρ is initially increasing. Moreover, setting
the above expression equal to zero establishes that ρ has a unique critical point where it crosses
the 45-degree line. Hence, ρ is increasing up to this point and decreasing thereafter.
(iii) Equating α(mmin) and ρ(mmin) and performing simple algebra reveals α(mmin) = E[λ]. 2
Proof of Lemma 5: Each part is proven in turn.
(i) Consider p1 ∈ (ν, p]. Given B’s strategy to accept p1 if and only if v1 = 1 and λ ≤ µ(p1), S’s
posterior beliefs are E[λ|p1, 0] = ρ(µ(p1)) ≤ ν and E[λ|p1, 1] = α(µ(p1)) ≥ ν. It then follows
from Lemma 1 that setting θ(p1, 0) = 1 and θ(p1, 1) = 0 is optimal. By Lemma 2, B with
v1 = 1 optimally accepts p1 if and only if
1− p1 ≥ λ(θ(p1, 0)− θ(p1, 1))(1− ν) = λ(1− ν),
or λ ≤ µ(p1).
(ii) Consider p1 ∈ (p, 1] and suppose ν > E[λ]. Given B’s strategy to accept p1 if and only if
v1 = 1 and λ ≤ m, S’s posterior beliefs are E[λ|p1, 0] = ρ(m) < ν and E[λ|p1, 1] = α(m) = ν.
It then follows from Lemma 1 that setting θ(p1, 0) = 1 and any θ(p1, 1) ∈ [0, 1] is optimal.
Mixing probability θ(p1, 1) is calibrated to make B with v1 = 1 and λ = m indifferent between
accepting and rejecting,
1− p1 = m(1− θ(p1, 1))(1− ν).
Now suppose ν < E[λ]. Given B’s strategy to accept p1 if and only if v1 = 1 and λ ≤ m, S’s
posterior beliefs are E[λ|p1, 0] = ρ(m) = ν and E[λ|p1, 1] = α(m) > ν. It then follows from
Lemma 1 that setting θ(p1, 1) = 0 and any θ(p1, 0) ∈ [0, 1] is optimal. Mixing probability
θ(p1, 0) is calibrated to make B with v1 = 1 and λ = m indifferent between accepting and
rejecting,
1− p1 = mθ(p1, 0)(1− ν).
2
Proof of Lemma 6: Each part is proven in turn.
(i) Differentiating α̂ gives
α̂′(µ̂) =
−(1− µ̂)f(µ̂)
[(
E[λ]− ∫ 1bµ λ(1− λ)f(λ) dλ)− µ̂(1− ∫ 1bµ (1− λ)f(λ) dλ))](
1− ∫ 1bµ (1− λ)f(λ) dλ)2 .
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This is negative for small µ̂ > 0. Hence, α̂ is initially decreasing. Moreover, setting the above
expression equal to zero establishes that α̂ has a unique critical point where it crosses the
45-degree line. Hence, α̂ is decreasing up to this point and increasing thereafter.
(ii) Differentiating ρ̂ gives
ρ̂′(µ̂) =
(1− µ̂)f(µ̂) ∫ 1bµ (λ− µ̂)(1− λ)f(λ) dλ(∫ 1bµ (1− λ)f(λ) dλ)2 .
This is strictly positive for µ̂ < 1.
(iii) Equating α̂ and ρ̂ and performing simple algebra reveals α̂(m̂max) = E[λ]. 2
Proof of Lemma 7: First, consider the Good PBE. Given B’s strategy to accept p1 ≤ ν, S’s
beliefs remain unchanged, E[λ|p1, 1] = E[λ] and E[λ|p1, 0] = E[λ] (immaterial). It then follows
from Lemma 1 that setting θ(p1, 1) = θ(p1, 0) = 0 if E[λ] > ν and θ(p1, 1) = θ(p1, 0) = 1 if E[λ] < ν
is optimal. By Lemma 2, B with v1 = ν has no incentives to reject p1 as
ν − p1 ≥ λ(θ(p1, 0)− θ(p1, 1))(1− ν) = 0
holds for all λ ∈ [0, 1].
Second, consider the Bad PBE.
(i) Suppose p1 ∈ (p, ν]. Given B’s strategy to reject p1 if and only if v1 = ν and λ > µ̂(p1), S’s
beliefs are E[λ|p1, 1] = α̂(µ̂(p1)) > ν and E[λ|p1, 0] = ρ̂(µ̂(p1)) < ν. It then follows from
Lemma 1 that setting θ(p1, 1) = 0 and θ(p1, 0) = 1 is optimal. By Lemma 2, B with v1 = ν
optimally accepts p1 if and only if
ν − p1 ≥ λ(θ(p1, 0)− θ(p1, 1))(1− ν) = λ(1− ν),
or λ ≤ µ̂(p1).
(ii) Suppose p1 ≤ p. Signaling is not possible in this case, all types of B must accept p1. S’s
beliefs remain unchanged, she optimally sets θ(p1, 1) = θ(p1, 0) = 0 if E[λ] > ν and θ(p1, 1) =
θ(p1, 0) = 1 if E[λ] < ν. Obviously, B with v1 = ν has no incentives to reject p1. 2
Proof of Proposition 3: Offering p1 = ν dominates p1 = 1 if and only if
2ν > I(m) + ν.
But, this follows from ν ≥ E[λ] > I(m).
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Thus, it is left to show that p1 = ν dominates all p1 ∈ (ν, p], or
2ν > I(µ)(1− µ(1− ν) + α(µ)) + (1− I(µ))ν
for all µ ∈ [m, 1). The condition may be recast as
(ν − I(µ)(1− ν(1− µ))) + (I(µ)µ− I(µ)α(µ)) > 0.
The first term of this expression is positive. The second term is also positive since
I(µ)µ− I(µ)α(µ) =
∫ µ
0
(µ− λ)λf(λ) dλ > 0
for all µ ∈ [m, 1). 2
Proof of Proposition 4: Offering p1 = ν dominates all p1 ∈ (ν, p] if and only if
ν +E[λ] > I(µ)(1− µ(1− ν) + α(µ)) + (1− I(µ))ν
for all µ ∈ [m, 1). The condition may be recast as
(E[λ]− I(µ)) + I(µ)ν(1− µ) + (I(µ)µ− I(µ)α(µ)) > 0.
The first two terms are non-negative, the third term is positive.
Thus, it is left to compare S’s continuation payoffs from charging p1 = 1 and ν. Offering p1 = 1
dominates p1 = ν if
I(m) + E[λ] > ν +E[λ],
or
I
(
ρ−1(ν)
)
> ν.
Taking the limit as ν goes to E yields E[λ] > E. Thus, when ν is close to E, S optimally offers
p1 = 1.
On the other hand, offering p1 = ν is optimal if
ν > I
(
ρ−1(ν)
)
.
Taking the limit as ν goes to E[λ] yields E[λ] > I(mmin). Thus, when ν is close to E[λ], S optimally
offers p1 = ν.
Finally, observe that
∆(ν) ≡ I (ρ−1(ν))− ν
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is decreasing in ν. Thus, there is a cut-off value ν ′′ such that S’s continuation payoff is higher under
p1 = 1 if ν < ν ′′, and it is higher under p1 = ν if ν ∈ (ν ′′, E[λ]). 2
Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose that in the Bad PBE, S offers p1 > ν, then she can get the
same payoff in the Good PBE by adopting the same strategy. Hence, suppose p1 ∈ {p} ∪ (p, ν].
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: ν ≥ E[λ]. S’s expected payoff in the Good PBE is 2ν. First, suppose S offers p1 = p in
the Bad PBE, then her expected payoff is p+ ν < 2ν.
Second, suppose S offers p1 ∈ (p, ν]. It can be shown that
Î(µ̂)(ν − µ̂(1− ν) + α̂(µ̂)) +
(
1− Î(µ̂)
)
ν < 2ν,
for all µ̂ ∈ [0, m̂). The condition may be recast as
Î(µ̂)µ̂(1− ν) + (ν − E[λ]) +
∫ 1
bµ λ(1− λ)f(λ) dλ > 0.
The first two terms are non-negative, the third term is positive.
Case 2: ν < E[λ]. S’s expected payoff in the Good PBE is at least ν+E[λ]. First, suppose S offers
p1 = p in the Bad PBE, then her expected payoff is p+ E[λ] < ν +E[λ].
Second, suppose S offers p1 ∈ (p, ν]. It can be shown that
Î(µ̂)(ν − µ̂(1− ν) + α̂(µ̂)) +
(
1− Î(µ̂)
)
ν < ν +E[λ],
for all µ̂ ∈ [0, m̂). The condition may be recast as
Î(µ̂)µ̂(1− ν) +
∫ 1
bµ λ(1− λ)f(λ) dλ > 0.
The first terms is positive, the second term is non-negative. 2
Proof of Proposition 6: Each part is proven in turn.
(i) Combined with Proposition 4, Proposition 5 implies that if ν ≤ ν ′′, then offering p1 = 1 strictly
dominates p1 = p and all p1 ∈ (p, p). Thus, there exists ² > 0 such that when ν < ν′′ + ²,
offering p1 = 1 is optimal in the Bad PBE.
(ii) Suppose ν > E[λ]. Offering p1 = p dominates all p1 ∈ (p, ν] if
2ν > Î(µ̂)(ν − µ̂(1− ν) + α̂(µ̂)) +
(
1− Î(µ̂)
)
ν
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for all µ̂ ∈ [0, m̂). Taking the limit as ν goes to E yields E > E[λ]E.
Second, offering p1 = p dominates all p1 ∈ (ν, p] if
2ν > I(µ)(1− µ(1− ν) + α(µ)) + (1− I(µ))ν
for all µ ∈ [m, 1). Taking the limit as ν goes to E yields E > E[λ]E.
Third, offering p1 = p dominates p1 = 1 if
2ν > I(µ) + ν.
Taking the limit as ν goes to E yields E > E[λ].
Thus, there exists ξ > 0 such that if ν > E − ξ, then offering p1 = p is optimal in the Bad
PBE. 2
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Appendix B
Proof of Example 1: For any x ∈ [0, 1] it is notationally convenient to define
J1(x) ≡
∫ x
0
λf(λ) dλ,
J2(x) ≡
∫ x
0
λ2f(λ) dλ,
Ĵ1(x) ≡
∫ 1
x
(1− λ)f(λ) dλ,
Ĵ2(x) ≡
∫ 1
x
λ(1− λ)f(λ) dλ.
Note that I(x) = J1(x) and Î(x) = 1− Ĵ1(x). Employing the change of variables w =
√
1− λ yields
J1(x) =
∫ x
0
λ
2
√
1− λ dλ =
∫ 1
√
1−x
(
1− w2) 2w
2w
dw
=
∫ 1
√
1−x
(
1− w2) dw = (w − 1
3
w3
)∣∣∣∣1√
1−x
=
1
3
(
2− (2 + x)√1− x) ,
J2(x) =
∫ x
0
λ2
2
√
1− λ dλ =
∫ 1
√
1−x
(
1− w2)2 2w
2w
dw =
∫ 1
√
1−x
(
1− 2w2 + w4) dw
=
(
w − 2
3
w3 +
1
5
w5
)∣∣∣∣1√
1−x
=
1
15
(
8− (8 + 4x+ 3x2)√1− x) ,
Ĵ1(x) =
∫ 1
x
(1− λ)
2
√
1− λ dλ =
∫ 1
x
1
2
√
1− λdλ
= −1
3
(√
1− λ
) 3
2
∣∣∣∣1
x
=
1
3
(1− x)√1− x,
Ĵ2(x) =
∫ 1
x
λ(1− λ)
2
√
1− λ dλ =
∫ 1
x
1
2
λ
√
1− λdλ =
∫ √1−x
0
1
2
(
1− w2)w2w dw
=
(
1
3
w3 − 1
5
w5
)∣∣∣∣
√
1−x
0
=
1
15
(2 + 3x)(1− x)√1− x.
27
Therefore,
E[λ] = J1(1) =
2
3
,
E =
E[λ]− J2(1)
1− E[λ] =
2/3− 8/15
1− 2/3 =
2
5
,
E =
J2(1)
E[λ]
=
8/15
2/3
=
4
5
,
α(µ) =
J2(µ)
J1(µ)
=
8− (8 + 4µ+ 3µ2)√1− µ
5
(
2− (2 + µ)√1− µ) ,
ρ(µ) =
E[λ]− J2(µ)
1− J1(µ) =
2 +
(
8 + 4µ+ 3µ2
)√
1− µ
5
(
1 + (2 + µ)
√
1− µ) ,
α̂(µ̂) =
E[λ]− Ĵ2(µ̂)
1− Ĵ1(µ̂)
=
10− (2 + 3µ̂) (1− µ̂)
√
1− µ̂
5
(
3− (1− µ̂)
√
1− µ̂
) ,
ρ̂(µ̂) =
Ĵ2(µ̂)
Ĵ1(µ̂)
=
2 + 3µ̂
5
,
m̂ = ρ̂−1
(
2
3
)
=
1
3
(
5× 2
3
− 2
)
=
4
9
.
The value of m cannot be calculated explicitly. Observe that
α(m) =
2
3
< α(0.91) =
8− (8 + 4× 0.91 + 3× (0.91)2)× 0.3
5× (2− (2 + 0.91)× 0.3) =
7679
11500
.
Since α is an increasing function, the above inequality implies m < 0.91.
S’s continuation payoff over p1 ∈ (p, p] is maximized at p1 = ν. To see this, first consider prices
p1 ∈ [ν, p). In terms of µ ∈ (m, 1], S’s continuation payoff can be written as
piS(µ) = I(µ)(1− µ(1− ν) + α(µ)) + (1− I(µ))ν
= I(µ)(1− µ)(1− ν) + I(µ)α(µ) + ν.
Differentiating with respect to µ yields
pi′S(µ) = (µf(µ)(1− µ)− I(µ))(1− ν) + µ2f(µ)
= (µf(µ)− I(µ))(1− ν) + µ2f(µ)ν.
The first term is positive since f is an increasing function and, therefore,
µf(µ) >
∫ µ
0
f(λ) dλ >
∫ µ
0
λf(λ) dλ = I(µ).
The second term is also positive. Thus, S’s continuation payoff is maximized at µ = 1, which
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corresponds to p1 = ν.
Next, consider prices p1 ∈ (p, ν]. In terms of µ̂ ∈ [0, m̂), S’s continuation payoff can be written
as
piS(µ̂) = Î(µ̂)(ν − µ̂(1− ν) + α̂(µ̂)) +
(
1− Î(µ̂)
)
ν
= −Î(µ̂)µ̂(1− ν) + Î(µ̂)α̂(µ̂)) + ν.
Differentiating with respect to µ̂ yields
pi′S(µ̂) = −
(
(1− µ̂)f(µ̂)µ̂+ Î(µ̂)
)
(1− ν) + µ̂(1− µ̂)f(µ̂)
= (1− µ̂)f(µ̂)µ̂ν − Î(µ̂)(1− ν)
=
(1− µ̂)µ̂
2
√
1− µ̂ ×
2
3
−
(
1− 1
3
(1− µ̂)
√
1− µ̂
)
× 1
3
= −1
9
(
3− (2µ̂+ 1)
√
1− µ̂
)
< 0.
Thus, S’s continuation payoff is maximized at µ̂ = 0, which corresponds to p1 = ν.
As it was shown above, S’s continuation payoff over p1 ∈ (p, p] is maximized at p1 = ν. B accepts
p1 = ν if and only if v1 = 1; maximum information is conveyed, E[λ|ν, 0] = E and E[λ|ν, 1] = E. S
offers p2 = q1 + (1− q1)ν in the second period; her expected payoff is
ΠS(ν) = E[λ]
(
ν + E
)
+ (1− E[λ])ν = 2
3
(
2
3
+
4
5
)
+
1
3
× 2
3
=
6
5
.
Another potentially optimal price is
p1 = p = ν − m̂(1− ν) = 23 −
4
9
× 1
3
=
14
27
.
B accepts the price; S offers p2 = ν in the second period. S’s expected payoff is
ΠS(p) = p+ ν =
14
27
+
2
3
=
32
27
<
6
5
.
Finally, suppose S charges p1 = 1. B accepts the price if and only if v1 = 1 and λ ≤ m; the
information conveyed has no value to S. S offers p2 = ν in the second period; her expected payoff is
ΠS(1) = I(m) + ν < I(0.91) +
2
3
=
1
3
(2− (2 + 0.91)× 0.3) + 2
3
=
3127
3000
<
6
5
.
2
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Proof of Example 2: For uniformly distributed prior beliefs:
J1(x) ≡
∫ x
0
λdλ =
x2
2
,
J2(x) ≡
∫ x
0
λ2 dλ =
x3
3
,
Ĵ1(x) ≡
∫ 1
x
(1− λ) dλ = 1
2
(
1− 2x+ x2) ,
Ĵ2(x) ≡
∫ 1
x
λ(1− λ) dλ = 1
6
(
1− 3x2 + 2x3) .
Therefore,
E[λ] = J1(1) =
1
2
,
E =
E[λ]− J2(1)
1− E[λ] =
1/2− 1/3
1− 1/2 =
1
3
,
E =
J2(1)
E[λ]
=
1/3
1/2
=
2
3
,
α(µ) =
J2(µ)
J1(µ)
=
2
3
µ,
ρ(µ) =
E[λ]− J2(µ)
1− J1(µ) =
3− 2µ3
3 (2− µ2) ,
α̂(µ̂) =
E[λ]− Ĵ2(µ̂)
1− Ĵ1(µ̂)
=
2 + 3µ̂2 − 2µ̂3
3 (1 + 2µ̂− µ̂2) ,
ρ̂(µ̂) =
Ĵ2(µ̂)
Ĵ1(µ̂)
=
1− 3µ2 + 2µ3
3 (1− 2µ+ µ2) =
2µ̂+ 1
3
,
mmin = α−1(E[λ]) =
3
2
× 1
2
=
3
4
,
m̂max = ρ̂−1(E[λ]) =
3
2
× 1
2
− 1
2
=
1
4
.
Also,
m =
{
ρ−1(ν), if ν ∈ (13 , 12)
3
2ν, if ν ∈
[
1
2 ,
2
3
)
,
m̂ =
{
3ν−1
2 , if ν ∈
(
1
3 ,
1
2
)
α̂−1(ν), if ν ∈ [12 , 23).
For any ν ∈ (1/3, 2/3), S’s continuation payoff over p1 ∈ (p, p] is maximized at p1 = ν. To see
this, first consider prices p1 ∈ [ν, p). In terms of µ ∈ (m, 1], S’s continuation payoff can be written
as
piS(µ) = I(µ)(1− µ)(1− ν) + I(µ)α(µ) + ν.
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Differentiating with respect to µ yields
pi′S(µ) = (µf(µ)− I(µ))(1− ν) + µ2f(µ)ν
=
(
µ− µ
2
2
)
(1− ν) + µ2ν > 0.
Thus, S’s continuation payoff is maximized at µ = 1, which corresponds to p1 = ν.
Next, consider prices p1 ∈ (p, ν]. In terms of µ̂ ∈ [0, m̂), S’s continuation payoff can be written
as
piS(µ̂) = −Î(µ̂)µ̂(1− ν) + Î(µ̂)α̂(µ̂)) + ν.
Differentiating with respect to µ̂ yields
pi′S(µ̂) = (1− µ̂)f(µ̂)µ̂ν − Î(µ̂)(1− ν)
= (1− µ̂)µ̂ν −
(
1− 1
2
(
1− 2µ̂+ µ̂2)) (1− ν)
=
1
2
(
1 + 4µ̂− 3µ̂2) ν − 1
2
(
1 + 2µ̂− µ̂2)
<
1
2
(
1 + 4µ̂− 3µ̂2)× 2
3
− 1
2
(
1 + 2µ̂− µ̂2)
= −1
6
(
1− 2µ̂+ 3µ̂2) = −1
6
(
(1− µ̂)2 + 2µ̂2) < 0.
Thus, S’s continuation payoff is maximized at µ̂ = 0, which corresponds to p1 = ν.
Hence, for any ν ∈ (1/3, 2/3) S’s continuation payoff over p1 ∈ (p, p] is maximized at p1 = ν.
B accepts p1 = ν if and only if v1 = 1; maximum information is conveyed, E[λ|ν, 0] = E and
E[λ|ν, 1] = E. S offers p2 = q1 + (1− q1)ν in the second period; her expected payoff is
ΠS(ν) = E[λ]
(
ν +E
)
+ (1−E[λ])ν = 1
2
(
ν +
2
3
)
+
1
2
ν =
1
3
+ ν.
Another potentially optimal price is
p1 = p = ν − m̂(1− ν) =
{
ν − 3ν−12 (1− ν), if ν ∈
(
1
3 ,
1
2
)
ν − α̂−1(ν)(1− ν), if ν ∈ [12 , 23).
B accepts the price; S charges p2 = 1 if ν < E[λ] and p2 = ν if ν ≥ E[λ]. S’s expected payoff is
ΠS(p) = p+max{E[λ], ν} =
{
ν − 3ν−12 (1− ν) + 12 , if ν ∈
(
1
3 ,
1
2
)
ν − α̂−1(ν)(1− ν) + ν, if ν ∈ [12 , 23)
=
{
1− ν + 3ν22 , if ν ∈
(
1
3 ,
1
2
)
2ν − α̂−1(ν)(1− ν), if ν ∈ [12 , 23).
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Finally, suppose S charges p1 = 1. B accepts the price if and only if v1 = 1 and λ ≤ m; the
information conveyed has no value to S. S offers p2 = 1 if ν < E[λ] and p2 = ν if ν ≥ E[λ]; her
expected payoff is
ΠS(1) = I(m) + max{E[λ], ν} =
 12 + (ρ
−1(ν))2
2 , if ν ∈
(
1
3 ,
1
2
)
ν + 98ν
2, if ν ∈ [12 , 23).
Consider pessimistic beliefs, ν ∈ [1/2, 2/3). Charging p1 = p yields higher continuation payoff
to S than p1 = ν if and only if
2ν − α̂−1(ν)(1− ν) > 1
3
+ ν,
or
ν − α̂−1(ν)(1− ν) > 1
3
.
Observe that the left hand side is increasing in ν. Therefore,
ν − α̂−1(ν)(1− ν) ≥ 1
2
− 1
4
× 1
2
=
3
8
>
1
3
;
i.e., p1 = p dominates p1 = ν.
Charging p1 = p yields higher continuation payoff to S than p1 = 1 if and only if
2ν − α̂−1(ν)(1− ν) > ν + 9
8
ν2,
or
α̂−1(ν) <
ν − 9ν2/8
1− ν .
Differentiating the right hand side with respect to ν yields
d
dν
(
ν − 9ν2/8
1− ν
)
=
9
8
− 1
8(1− ν)2 >
9
8
− 1
8(1− 2/3)2 = 0.
Therefore,
α̂−1(ν) ≤ 1
4
<
7
16
=
1/2− 9(1/2)2/8
1− 1/2 ≤
ν − 9ν2/8
1− ν ;
i.e., p1 = p dominates p1 = 1.
As it was shown above, S optimally offers p1 = p when beliefs are pessimistic. Now consider
optimistic beliefs, ν ∈ (1/3, 1/2). Charging p1 = p yields higher continuation payoff to S than p1 = ν
if and only if
1− ν + 3ν
2
2
>
1
3
+ ν,
or
(3ν − 2)2 > 0;
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i.e., p1 = p dominates p1 = ν.
Charging p1 = p yields higher continuation payoff to S than p1 = 1 if and only if
1− ν + 3ν
2
2
>
1
2
+
(
ρ−1(ν)
)2
2
.
Define the function
Λ(ν) ≡
(
1− ν + 3ν
2
2
)
−
(
1
2
+
(
ρ−1(ν)
)2
2
)
=
1
2
(
1 + 3ν2 − 2ν − (ρ−1(ν))2) .
Differentiating with respect to ν yields
Λ′(ν) = 3
(
ν − 1
3
)
+
ρ−1(ν)
(−1)× ρ′ (ρ−1(ν)) > 0.
Also, observe that
Λ
(
1
3
)
=
1
2
(
1 + 3× 1
32
− 2× 1
3
− 12
)
= −1
3
,
Λ
(
1
2
)
=
1
2
(
1 + 3× 1
22
− 2× 1
2
−
(
3
4
)2)
=
3
32
.
Therefore, there exists ν ′′′ such that S offers p1 = 1 in equilibrium if ν ∈ (1/3, ν ′′′), and she offers
p1 = p if ν ∈ [ν ′′′, 1/2). 2
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